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I. INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property (“IP”) protection in China has been murky and
amorphous. The country is currently enjoying a historic era with
significant infrastructure and investment projects occurring as the
Chinese consumer society substantially expands. These simultaneous
trends require that China commit to the securitization and protection of
IP rights to sustain its rapid economic growth. The country has
delivered statements purporting commitment to do better and support
IP rights, but the actions of the Chinese government around IP rights
tell a different story. China’s ultimate decision in this area will
determine the trajectory of the country’s future and position on the
world stage regarding intellectual property rights (“IPR”).
While IP rights have existed for centuries, 1 IP protection has
increased in importance with post-industrialization: the societal
transition from a manufacturing-based economy to a knowledge- and
services-based economy.2 According to the International Chamber of
Commerce,
[IPR]—the copyrights, patents, trademarks and similar
rights upon which the lion’s share of creative and
innovative products and services rely—have a vital role
in growing the economies of developed and developing
countries all over the world, in spurring innovation, in
giving large and small firms a range of tools to help drive
their success, and in benefitting consumers and society
through a continuous stream of innovative, competitive
products and services and an expansion of society’s
overall state of knowledge.3
Similarly, the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) also
affirmed that “[i]ndustrial property has long been recognized and used
by industrialized countries, and is being used by an ever increasing
number of developing countries, as an important tool of technological
and economic development.”4 And furthermore, a study commissioned

1

Irene Kosturakis, Intellectual Property 101, 46 TEX. J. BUS. L. 37, 38 (2014).
Julie E. Cohen, What Kind of Property Is Intellectual Property?, 52 HOUS. L.
REV. 691, 698 (2014).
3
ALLEN N. DIXON, INT’L CHAMBER OF COM., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
POWERHOUSE FOR INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 2 (2011).
4
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. [WIPO], WIPO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
HANDBOOK 164 (2d ed. 2004), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/
489/wipo_pub_489.pdf.
2
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by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization reported
that:
[D]eveloped countries, with many potential innovators,
have tended to opt for relatively strong IPR systems,
with the aim of encouraging inventive and creative
activities that are seen as an important source of longrun economic growth. With [research and development
(“R&D”)] spending concentrated in a handful of the
world’s richest countries, genuinely innovative activities
are limited in most developed and developing countries.
The majority of countries in the world have taken a
different approach, providing only weak IPR protection,
if any, as a way of allowing the rapid diffusion of
knowledge through imitation as a significant source of
technological development.5
The People’s Republic of China (“China” or “PRC”) favored the
latter approach until recently. 6 For years, China was known as the
“Pirate Nation.”7 Indeed, part of China’s strategy over the years has
5

ROD FALVEY & NEIL FOSTER, UNITED NATIONS INDUS. DEV. ORG., THE ROLE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH:
THEORY
AND
EVIDENCE,
at
vii–viii
(2006),
https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/2009-04/Role_of_intellectual_property_
rights_in_technology_transfer_and_economic_growth_0.pdf.
6
The ubiquity of copycats (pirates, counterfeiters, etc.) has been viewed as a
consequence of the preference of some Chinese for flexibility; in addition, it is
attributed to a lack of innovation consciousness. And while few countries fight
counterfeiting as vigorously as China, the effect of cracking down on counterfeiting
year after year has not been significant. Wang Jun (王軍), Zhongguo Shanzhai
Wenhua Wei He Shengxing? (中國山寨文化為何盛行?) [Why is China's Copycat
Culture Rampant?], Jinrong Shibao (金融時報) [FIN. TIMES] (Aug. 27, 2012, 6:12
PM), http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001046229?full=y&archive; cf. Tania
Branigan, Does China Deserve the Reputation as the Land of Copycats?, GUARDIAN
(Oct. 15, 2016, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/15/chinareputation-copycats-pelamis-intellectual-property. See generally Jack Carlson,
China’s Copycat Cities, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 29, 2012, 4:57 PM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/29/chinas-copycat-cities/.
7
In a chapter titled “Pirate Nation,” Fishman explains this nickname:
[T]he larger truth is that the Chinese economy has staked a great
deal on its counterfeiters. They provide the people with affordable
goods. . . . The counterfeiters give China’s growing number of
globally competitive companies the means to compete with
powerful foreign rivals who are forced to pay full fare for
proprietary technologies.
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been the outright theft of Western innovation8 and China’s acquisition
of innovation through mandatory technology transfer from Western
companies to Chinese partners 9 as part of the PRC’s Joint Venture
Law.10 Developed countries have long cautioned government leaders
TED C. FISHMAN, CHINA, INC. 236 (2006); see Alexandra Harney, Opinion, China’s
Copycat Culture, N.Y. TIMES: LATITUDE (Oct. 31, 2011, 11:37 PM),
https://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/31/chinas-copycat-culture/; see also
Austin Williams, The Origins of China’s Copycat Culture, GLOB.: INT’L BRIEFING,
https://www.global-briefing.org/2014/01/the-origins-of-chinas-copycat-culture/ (last
visited Oct. 25, 2021).
8
Mark Ward, Does China’s Government Hack US Companies to Steal Secrets?,
BBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-34324252; see
also Kim Zetter, US and China Reach Historic Agreement on Economic Espionage,
WIRED (Sept. 25, 2015, 3:16 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/09/us-china-reachhistoric-agreement-economic-espionage/; Rowena Mason, Xi Jinping State Visit: UK
and China Sign Cybersecurity Pact, GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2015, 12:13 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/oct/21/uk-china-cybersecurity-pact-xijinping-david-cameron.
9
“China needs to refrain from forcing or pressuring technology transfer, make
fundamental structural changes to strengthen [IP] protection and enforcement,
implement recent revisions to its IP measures, open China’s market to foreign
investment, and allow the market a decisive role in allocating resources.” U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE,
2020
SPECIAL
301
REPORT
39
(2020),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2020_Special_301_Report.pdf;
cf.
Dan
Prud’homme, 3 Myths About China’s IP Regime, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 24, 2019),
https://hbsp.harvard.edu/product/H058EW-PDF-ENG (“I have found that the most
egregious Chinese policies coercing technology transfer do not appear to be
commonly faced by foreign firms in recent years.”).
10
On July 1, 1979, the Second Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress
adopted The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese
and Foreign Investment, 18 I.L.M. 1163 (1979) [hereinafter Joint Venture Law]. The
law became effective on July 8, 1979. Id. For an English translation, see Daily Report:
People’s Republic of China, FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE (FBISCHI), FBIS-CHI-79-146 Supp. 019, July 27, 1979, and FBIS-CHI-79-147 Supp. 020,
July 30, 1979. On September 20, 1983, the State Council promulgated Regulations for
the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures
Using Chinese and Foreign Investment. 22 I.L.M. 1033 (1983). These regulations
provide the following articles:
Article 25. Each participant to a joint venture may contribute cash
or buildings, premises, equipment or other materials, industrial
property, know-how, right to the use of a site as investment, the
value of which shall be ascertained. If the investment is in the form
of buildings, premises, equipment or other materials, industrial
property or known-how, the prices shall be ascertained through
consultation by the parties to the joint venture on the basis of
fairness and reasonableness, or evaluated by the third party agreed
upon by parties to the joint venture.
....
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about national security concerns over largescale Chinese IP theft, and
Chinese companies have long reaped benefits from the lack of IP rights
enforcement by Chinese authorities.11 As an example, the Center for
Responsible Enterprise and Trade and PricewaterhouseCoopers have
reported that trade secret theft is between one and three percent of
GDP,12 meaning that the cost to an $18 trillion United States (“U.S.”)
economy is between $180 billion and $540 billion.
For years, the U.S. government complained openly about Chinese
efforts to steal U.S. IP—including patents, trade secrets, trademarks,
and copyrights—by both state-sponsored and private actors.13 Such a
strategy played a role in China’s rising economic and geopolitical
importance since it opened its door to the world starting in 1979. 14
Article 28. The industrial property or know-how contributed by the
foreign participant as investment shall meet one of the following
conditions:
(1) Capable of manufacturing new products urgently needed in
China or products suitable for export;
(2) Capable of improving markedly the performance quality of
existing products and raising productivity;
(3) Capable of notable savings in raw materials, fuel or power.
Article 29. Foreign participants who contribute industrial property
or know-how as investment shall present relevant documentation on
the industrial property or know-how, including photocopies of the
patent certificates or trademark registration certificates, statements
of validity, their technical characteristics, practical value, the basis
for calculating the price and the price agreement signed with the
Chinese participants. All these shall serve as an annex to the
contract.
Id. at 1037. But these regulations and the Joint Venture Law were both invalidated by
the Foreign Investment Law of the People's Republic of China (issued on Mar. 15,
2019, and effective on Jan. 1, 2020), and the accompanying regulations for that law
(issued on Dec. 26, 2019, and effective on Jan. 1, 2020). Nanda Lau & Karen Ip, China
Set to Implement the New Foreign Investment Law, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 10, 2020),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7965cc38-5837-47b9-9630dfa9c1c1e7ec.
11
See generally CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE ENTERPRISE AND TRADE &
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TRADE SECRET THEFT: A
FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANIES TO SAFEGUARD TRADE SECRETS AND MITIGATE
POTENTIAL THREATS (2014), https://www.innovation-asset.com/hubfs/blogfiles/CREATe.org-PwC-Trade-Secret-Theft-FINAL-Feb-2014_01.pdf.
12
Id. at 3.
13
Eric Rosenbaum, 1 in 5 Corporations Say China Has Stolen Their IP Within
the Last Year: CNBC CFO Survey, CNBC: CFO COUNCIL (Mar. 1, 2019, 10:21 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/28/1-in-5-companies-say-china-stole-their-ip-withinthe-last-year-cnbc.html.
14
See Shang-Jin Wei, The Open Door Policy and China’s Rapid Growth:
Evidence from City-Level Data, in 4 GROWTH THEORIES IN LIGHT OF THE EAST ASIAN
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Cyber attacks, corporate espionage, and forced technology transfers
have all been part of the Chinese playbook to steal U.S. trade secrets
and other IP for the last several decades.15 Even though former U.S.
President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping reached a
U.S.-China Cyber Agreement in 2015, 16 Chinese cyber attacks and
violations of U.S. companies’ IP rights continued after the agreement
was reached.17 Consequently, the United States Trade Representative
(“USTR”) continued to name and shame Chinese violators by routinely
placing China on the Priority Watch List of countries that do not respect
U.S. IP rights holders.18 In its 2018 report, looking back on 2017, the
USTR concluded:
[T]he state of [IP] protection and enforcement in China,
and market access for U.S. persons that rely on IP
protection, reflect the country’s failure to implement
promises to strengthen IP protection, open China’s
market to foreign investment, allow the market a
decisive role in allocating resources, and refrain from
government interference in private sector technology
transfer decisions.19
Other organs of the U.S. government concurred. For example, in
2020 the U.S. Department of Justice opined, “China is predominantly
responsible for the theft of U.S. intellectual property.” 20 In a major
government report in 2020, former U.S. President Donald J. Trump
concluded that “[a] more powerful and emboldened China is
increasingly asserting itself by stealing our technology and intellectual
property in an effort to erode United States economic and military
EXPERIENCE 73, 73 (Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger, eds., University of Chicago
Press 1995), https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c8545/c8545.pdf.
15
THE COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AMERICAN INTELL. PROP., IP COMMISSON 2019
REVIEW 3 (2019), http://www.ipcommission.org/report/ip_commission_2019_
review_of_progress_and_updated_recommendations.pdf.
16
CONG. RSCH. SERV., IN10376, U.S.-CHINA CYBER AGREEMENT 1 (2015).
17
Nicole Perlroth, How China Transformed into a Prime Cyber Threat to the
U.S., N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/19/technology
/china-hacking-us.html.
18
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2018 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 38 (2018),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2018%20Special%20301.pdf.
19
Id.
20
David H. Laufman et al., The Department of Justice’s National Security
Division Chief Addresses China’s Campaign to Steal U.S. Intellectual Property,
NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/departmentjustice-s-national-security-division-chief-addresses-china-s-campaign-to (reporting
on the public talk by John Demers, the head of the National Security Division at the
Department of Justice).
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superiority.” 21 Such a statement came as no surprise given that
President Trump claimed China was responsible for “the greatest theft
in the history of the world” while a presidential candidate in 2016.22
However, this narrative has become more complex as China
refocused from an importer of IP to an exporter of IP in the last decade,
thereby shifting the international geopolitics of innovation. In 2018,
China received more patent applications than the U.S., the European
Union (“EU”), Japan, and South Korea combined.23 Nor has it taken
China very long to significantly shift the international politics around
innovation. In 2012, for the first time, China topped the ranking for
both the source (filings by China) and the destination (filed in China).24
Out the top five national IP offices, the State Intellectual Property Office
of the People’s Republic of China (“SIPO”) was alone in recording
“double-digit growth for each of the three types of IP mentioned.”25
Continuous growth of registrations in China has been the main driver of
global IP growth over the last several years:
[SIPO] received the most applications in 2015 and
became the first office to receive more than a million
applications in a single year…SIPO—with 1,101,864
filings—received almost as many applications as the
combined total for the JPO (318,721), KIPO (213,694)
and the USPTO (589,410). The EPO received 160,028
applications. Together, the top five offices accounted for
82.5% of the world total in 2015, which was
considerably higher than their combined share in 2000
(70.4%). The four BRIC countries—Brazil, China, India
and the Russian Federation—rank among the top 10
offices.26
WIPO has also noted that “[d]ue to the high numbers of applications
filed in China, the offices of upper middle-income countries have seen
21

NAT’L
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
&
SEC.
CTR.,
NATIONAL
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2020-2022,
at I (2020), https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/features/20200205National_CI_Strategy_2020_2022.pdf.
22
Trump Accuses China of ‘Raping’ US with Unfair Trade Policy, BBC NEWS
(May 2, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-36185012.
23
Andreas Becker, China Flexes its Patent Muscle, DW AKADEMIE (Mar. 7,
2018), https://www.dw.com/en/china-flexes-its-patent-muscle/a-42872310.
24
WIPO, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS 5 (2013),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/941/wipo_pub_941_2013.pdf.
25
Id.
26
WIPO, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS 21 (2016),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_941_2016.pdf.
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their combined share of the world total increase from 16.5% in 2005 to
43.5% in 2015. SIPO accounted for 87.7% of the upper middle-income
group total.”27 This trend has continued for the last half decade. For
instance, according to the 2020 Global Innovation Index Report
released by WIPO, “China ranked 14th, up 15 places from 2015.”28
China’s total “import and export of intellectual property royalties was
US$46.31 billion, of which exports were US$8.68 billion, a year-onyear increase of 31.5%.”29
This Article explores two factors driving the increased importance
of IP rights protection for China in the last decade. The first factor is
the geopolitical competition for dominance in strategic industries that is
underway between the U.S. and China.30 The second is the exponential
growth of China’s consumer society. Both of these are two major
drivers of the growing importance of IP rights protections in China
today, and this Article addresses the challenges they present to China’s
international and domestic IP strategy.
The first factor, the geopolitical competition between the U.S. and
China for dominance in strategic industries, has always existed in the
countries’ relationship. However, in the last few years China has made
substantial strides establishing itself as a key player in significant
worldwide industries. On May 8, 2015, the State Council of the
People’s Republic of China launched the “Made in China 2025”
initiative, aiming to transform China from a world factory of quantity
to one of quality. 31 Chinese authorities have used state-owned

27

Id. at 22.
Cao Xiuying (曹秀英), Chen Zhang Yu: Jiaqiang Da Shuju He Rengong
Zhineng Lingyu Zhishi Chanquan Baohu Shi Zai Bi Xing (沉長宇：加強大數據和
人 工 智 能 領 域 知 識 產 權 保 護 勢 在 必 行 ) [Shen Changyu: It is Imperative to
Strengthen Intellectual Property Protection in the Field of Big Data and Artificial
Intelligence], Renmai Wangluo (人民网) [PEOPLE.CN] (Apr. 26, 2021, 8:18 AM),
http://finance.people.com.cn/n1/2021/0426/c1004-32087942.html.
29
Id.
30
“President Biden and many members of Congress rightly view the United
States and other democratic, market-based countries as being locked in competition
with China and other authoritarian, state-led nations over whose values and norms will
prevail in an increasingly diverse world.” Joanna Shelton, The CPTPP and Intellectual
Property Rights Protection, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (June 28, 2021),
https://www.csis.org/analysis/cptpp-and-intellectual-property-rights-protection.
31
“To achieve the strategic goal of a manufacturing power, we must adhere to
problem-oriented, overall planning, and highlight the key points; we must build
consensus from the whole society, accelerate the transformation and upgrading of
manufacturing, and comprehensively improve the quality of development and core
competitiveness.” Guowuyuan Guanyu Yinfa “Zhongguo Zhizao 2025” De Tongzhi
(國務院關於印發《中國製造2025》的通知) [Notice of the State Council on
Printing and Distributing "Made in China 2025"], Zhengfu Wangluo (王政富)
28
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enterprises 32 to place bets on national winners which can directly
compete with big Western technology companies in many other future
strategic industries like autonomous vehicles, blockchain, and
robotics.33 At a State Council Executive Meeting in 2017, Premier Li
Keqiang emphasized that “[the Chinese] must give full play to the role
of innovation in spurring entrepreneurship and employment, and speed
up the transformation of innovation into real productivity.”34 As part of
the Made in China 2025 initiative, many Chinese companies expanded
their R&D investments into advanced technology spaces.35 There is
also a program to provide incentives to attract the best talent for
employment with Chinese companies.36 Procurement and enforcement
[GOV.CN]
(May
8,
2015),
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/201505/19/content_9784.htm.
32
See generally Mark McLaughlin, State-Owned Enterprises and Threats to
National Security Under Investment Treaties, 19 CHINESE J. OF INT’L L. 283 (2020).
33
Scott Kennedy, Made in China 2025, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (June
1, 2015), https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025.
34
Xu Wei (徐偉), Zhongguo Jinyibu Gaige Yi Qudong Chuangxin
(中國進一步改革以驅動創新) [China to Further Reform to Drive Innovation],
Zhengfu Wangluo (王政富) [GOV.CN], (Aug. 30, 2017, 8:25 PM),
http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/news/2017/08/30/content_281475826050062.ht
m.
35
PETER FRANKOPAN, THE NEW SILK ROADS: THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE
WORLD 200 (2019) (stating that the Beijing government is “pouring money and
resources into artificial intelligence,” and “building new technology parks across the
country”). In addition:
[C]hina’s alternative digital universe now creates and captures
oceans of new data about the real world. That wealth of information
on users—their location every second of the day, how they
commute, what foods they like, when and where they buy groceries
and beer—will prove invaluable in the era of AI implementation. It
gives these companies a detailed treasure trove of these users’ daily
habits, one that can be combined with deep-learning algorithms to
offer tailor-made services ranging from financial auditing to city
planning. It also vastly outstrips what Silicon Valley’s leading
companies can decipher from your searches, “likes,” or occasional
online purchases. This unparalleled trove of real-world data will
give Chinese companies a major leg up in developing AI-driven
services.
KAI-FU LEE, AI SUPERPOWERS: CHINA, SILICON VALLEY, AND THE NEW WORLD
ORDER 17 (2018).
36
The Office of the Ministry of Education has stated that gathering talent with an
international focus is important to China:
[T]he flow of high-level talents in colleges and universities should
obey and serve . . . the major national development strategies such
as . . . the “Belt and Road” initiative. The competition for talents
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of IP rights is paramount to protecting investments in talent and
ensuring future domination of strategic industries.
The second factor for increased importance of IP rights protection
is the growth of China’s consumer society, which relies on a growing
middle class as well as a basic set of public goods provided by the
government that allow the middle class to flourish. 37 These public
goods include the maintenance of public security, construction of safe
roads, crime prevention, compliance with secure construction practices,
and provision of other public services and infrastructure.38 Consumer
protection is also required—meaning enhanced product safety
legislation and enforcement action—including consistent regulation for
the safety of food and beverages, medicine, appliances, and other
devices.39 According to a study for the Brookings Institution,
[C]hina is experiencing the fastest expansion of the
middle class the world has ever seen, during a period
when the global middle class is already expanding at a
must have an international perspective . . . and pay attention to the
introduction of high-level overseas talents. The “Changjiang
Scholars Award Program” will continue to increase the focus on the
introduction of high-level talents from overseas and the
development of high-level talents from universities in the western
and northeastern regions.
Jiaoyu Bu Bangongshi (教育部辦公室) [Office of the Ministry of Education], Jiaoyu
Bu Bangong Ting Guanyu Jianchi Zhengque Yindao Cujin Gaoxiao Gao Cengci
Rencai
Heli
You
Xu
Liudong
De
Tongzhi
(教育部辦公廳關於堅持正確引導促進高校高層次人才合理有序流動的通知)
[Notice of the General Office of the Ministry of Education on Adhering to Correct
Guidance and Promoting the Reasonable and Orderly Flow of High-level Talents in
Colleges and Universities], Zhengfu Wangluo (政府网) [GOV.CN] (Jan. 25, 2017),
http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A04/s7051/201701/t20170126_295715.html; cf. OFF.
OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE, THE ELEMENTS OF THE CHINA CHALLENGE 13 (2020),
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/20-02832-Elements-of-ChinaChallenge-508.pdf (“The [Chinese Communist Party] uses the Thousand Talents
Program (TTP) and other party-run recruitment efforts to target universities and impel
students and professors to obtain—lawfully or otherwise—technology, trade secrets,
proprietary data, and research and development.”).
37
See generally Jim Tankersley, The 100% Economy: Why the U.S. Needs a
Strong
Middle
Class
to
Thrive,
ATLANTIC
(May
18,
2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/05/the-100-economy-why-theus-needs-a-strong-middle-class-to-thrive/257385/.
38
See generally Dominic Barton, The Rise of the Middle Class in China and its
Impact on the Chinese and World Economies, in US-CHINA 2022: ECONOMIC
RELATIONS IN THE NEXT 10 YEARS (China-United States Exchange Foundation ed.,
2013),
https://www.chinausfocus.com/2022/wp-content/uploads/Part+02Chapter+07.pdf.
39
See Consumer-Protection Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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historically unprecedented rate thanks in part to some of
its neighbors like India. By 2027, we estimate that 1.2
billion Chinese will be in the middle class, making up
one quarter of the world total.40
Unsurprisingly, Goldman Sachs predicted that “[a]s more Chinese
consumers gain purchasing power, their needs and preferences will have
a powerful effect on the global economy.”41
This proliferating consumer society coupled with China’s growing
military power are the major challenges of our time.42 China fostered
much of the globe’s economic growth in the post-2008 global
recession.43 After the initial economic hurdles of COVID-19, China’s
economy grew despite the initial economic slowdown earlier in 2020.44
By the end of 2020, China’s economy grew a reported 2.3% compared
to the previous year.45 Rapid and effective pandemic prevention and
40

HOMI KHARAS & MEAGAN DOOLEY, BROOKINGS INST., CHINA’S INFLUENCE
ON THE GLOBAL MIDDLE CLASS 1 (2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/
uploads/2020/10/FP_20201012_china_middle_class_kharas_dooley.pdf.
41
The Rise of China’s New Consumer Class, GOLDMAN SACHS,
https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/macroeconomic-insights/growth-ofchina/chinese-consumer/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2021).
42
See generally DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE
U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (2021). This report specifically notes that:
[T]he Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will continue its whole-ofgovernment efforts to spread China’s influence, undercut that of the
United States, drive wedges between Washington and its allies and
partners, and foster new international norms that favor the
authoritarian Chinese system. . . . China will maintain its major
innovation and industrial policies because Chinese leaders see this
strategy as necessary to reduce dependence on foreign technologies,
enable military advances, and sustain economic growth and thus
ensure the CCP’s survival.
Id. at 6.
43
See CONG . RSCH . SERV ., RL33534, CHINA ’S ECONOMIC RISE: HISTORY ,
TRENDS, CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 5 (2019).
44
Mohammed Alardhi, Rapid Growth in China Post-COVID Makes it Ripe for
Investment, WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 18, 2021), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/
01/rapid-growth-china-post-covid-ripe-investment/.
45
Guojia Tongji Ju (國家統計局) [National Bureau of Statistics], 2020 Nian
Wending
Guomin
Jingji
Zhuyao
Mubiao
Hao
Yu
Yuqi
(2020年穩定國民經濟主要目標好於預期) [The Main Goal of the Stabilization of
the National Economy in 2020 has Been Achieved Better than Expected], Zhengfu
Wangluo (政府网) [GOV.CN] (Jan. 18, 2021), http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/
PressRelease/202101/t20210118_1812432.html. But, the International Monetary
Fund had predicted an annual growth rate of only 1.9% in 2020 and 7.9% in 2021 for
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control measures helped China contain the epidemic, making the
country the only major economy that achieved positive growth in
2020.46 And while the almost two year trade war between China and
the U.S.47 slowed the rapid pace of growth that China experienced for
three decades,48 the Belt and Road initiative, detailed more in Part II, is
designed to ensure long-term economic growth.49
This Article focuses on the role of IP rights in China today. It does
so by highlighting the transition China has made from “Pirate Nation”
to global innovator in a mere few decades. Part II surveys the
geopolitical policies—namely the Made in China 2025 and the Belt and
Road initiative—that Beijing is pursuing for China’s future
development and influence. IP is a major underpinning for these
policies. 50 Part III of this Article explores China’s shift from a
manufacturing-driven economic growth strategy to a post-industrial
(also known as knowledge-based) economic growth strategy and the
key role that IP plays in this transition towards a consumption-based
economy. Part IV examines the trends in IP rights filings in China and
outside countries that are to the benefit of Chinese innovators. Part V
of the Article concludes with a summary of the challenges facing China
as it moves from a country of copycats to a leading global innovator.
Much of that transition has been due to enhanced Chinese IP rights
China. IMF Executive Board Concludes 2020 Article IV Consultation with the
People’s Republic of China, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/01/06/pr211-china-imf-executiveboard-concludes-2020-article-iv-consultation.
46
Wang Jianing (王佳寧), Zhongguo Jingji Yinling Quanqiu Yiqing Fusu (中國
經濟引領全球疫情復甦) [China’s Economy Leads the Recovery in the Global
Epidemic], Xinhua Wang (新華網) [XINHUANET] (Mar. 3, 2021, 5:34 PM),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2021-03/03/c_1127163657.htm. This growth may
not be as robust as originally predicted. See Ryan Woo, Fitch Cuts China 2021 GDP
Forecast to +8.1% vs +8.4% on Property Slowdown, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2021, 10:53
PM), https://www.reuters.com/world/china/fitch-cuts-china-2021-gdp-forecast-81vs-84-property-slowdown-2021-09-23/; see also James Palmer, Property Crisis
Underpins China’s Economic Slowdown, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 20, 2021, 5:17 PM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/20/china-property-crisis-economic-slowdown/.
47
James Cooper, The Ugly Side of Reciprocity: The Trade War with United
States’ Partners Gets Hotter, BUS. TIMES (July 5, 2018, 5:50 AM),
https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/opinion/the-ugly-side-of-reciprocity-the-tradewar-with-the-united-states-partners-gets-hotter.
48
Brad W. Setser, China’s Slowdown and the World Economy, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELS. (Feb. 5, 2019, 12:16 PM), https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinasslowdown-and-world-economy.
49
Andrew Chatzky & James McBride, China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,
COUNCIL
ON
FOREIGN
RELS.
(Jan.
28,
2020,
7:00
AM),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.
50
CONG . RSCH . SERV ., IF11684, CHINA ’S 14TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN : A FIRST
LOOK 1 (2021).
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protection, which has long been an important factor in promotion of
economic growth.51
II. THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR CHINA
Chinese President Xi Jinping introduced China’s “Silk Road
Economic Belt” concept for the first time in September of 2013 during
his visit to Kazahkstan.52 At the urging of President Xi, the National
Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
and the Ministry of Commerce all jointly released a concrete action plan
on the Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”), also known as “One Belt One
Road,” 53 on March 28, 2015. 54 According to various legal and
economic scholars, the BRI “is a developmental strategy promoted by
the [PRC] to foster mercantile connectivity and cooperation among
countries.” 55 The BRI “aims to promote the connectivity of Asian,
European and African continents and their adjacent seas” by comprising
land-based and maritime-based trade connections.56
Although the initiative is predominately percieved as President Xi’s
ambitious goal to build infrastructure connecting China’s lessdeveloped border regions with neighboring countries, it also
“significantly influenced China’s national [IP] strategy[.]” 57 For
51

See FALVEY & FOSTER, supra note 5, at iii (stating that new evidence links
“protection of IPRs to economic growth, innovation and technology diffusion”).
52
Brenda Goh & John Ruwitch, Pressure on as Xi’s ‘Belt and Road’ Enshrined
in Chinese Party Charter, REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2017, 7:26 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-silkroad/pressure-on-as-xis-beltand-road-enshrined-in-chinese-party-charter-idUSKBN1CT1IW (“First mentioned
during a speech Xi gave to university students in Kazakhstan in 2013 . . . .”).
53
“The very name, especially in its English translation, has caused confusion,
evolving as it has from the New Silk Road to the BRI.” Duncan Freeman, The Belt
and Road Initiative and the Overcapacity Connection, in THE BELT AND ROAD
INITIATIVE AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 120, 120 (Maria Adele Carrai et al. eds., 2020).
54
Gong Jian “Yidai Yilu” De Yuanjing Yu Xingdong (共建“一帶一路”的願
景與行動) [Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Belt and Road], Zhongguo Wang
(中國網) [CHINA.ORG.CN] (Mar. 28, 2015), http://www.china.org.cn/china/Off_the_
Wire/2015-03/28/content_35182638.htm.
55
Maria Adele Carrai et al., The Belt and Road Initiative and Global Governance:
By Way of Introduction, in THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 1, 2 (Maria Adele Carrai et al. eds., 2020).
56
“Yidai yilu” xingdong jihua (“一帶一路”行動計劃) [Action Plan on the Belt
and Road Initiative], Zhengfu Wangluo (政府网) [GOV.CN] (Mar. 30, 2015, 7:31 PM),
http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.ht
m.
57
Jyh-An Lee, The New Silk Road to Global IP Landscape, CHINESE U. H.K. FAC.
L. RSCH. PAPER NO. 2016-30, 417, 417 (2016).
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instance, Xinhua News Agency and China International Intellectual
Corporation established “a database that documents seven indices of IP
risks” in BRI jurisdictions. 58 The database serves to alert Chinese
enterprises of IP risks when they consider investing in BRI projects.59
Furthermore, at the 19th National Congress in October 2017,
President Xi doubled-down on the BRI by including it in the
Communist Party’s Constitution. 60 The BRI project reflects the
Chinese President’s plan to secure his legacy in leading China to a
global leadership role.61 With 138 countries across Asia, Africa, and
Europe having joined the BRI, the initiative has driven trade and capital
flows between the East and the West by improving ancient
infrastructure and maritime routes. 62 These routes will make highgrowth developing countries more accessible over the next few decades,
and the routes will include access to two-thirds of the world’s
population.63
The BRI is designed to increase international production capacity,
cooperation, and infrastructure connectivity. 64 From 2013 to 2018,
direct investment by Chinese companies in countries along the route
exceeded US $90 billion, averaging an annual growth rate of 5.2%.65
The value of newly-signed contracts in countries along the route
exceeded US $600 billion, providing an average annual growth rate of
11.9%. 66 By the end of April 2019, many Chinese companies and
foreign countries jointly established several trade cooperation zones,
with a cumulative investment of nearly US $40 billion.67
It is anticipated the BRI will consume most of China’s outbound
investment in the decades to come and cost over $1.7 trillion per year
through 2030. 68 Based on this infrastructure investment, the annual
trade volume between China and countries along the BRI routes is

58

Id. at 420.
Id. at 420–21.
60
Brenda Goh & John Ruwitch, supra note 52.
61
Id.
62
Belt and Road Initiative, EUR. BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV.,
https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/belt-and-road/overview.html (last visited Oct. 27,
2021).
63
Chatzky & McBride, supra note 49.
64
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF CHINA, CHINA'S PROGRESS REPORT ON
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2030 AGENDA FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 44 (2019),
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/2030kcxfzyc/P02019092478082
3323749.pdf.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 44–45.
68
Peter J. Rimmer, China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Underlying Economic and
International Relations Dimensions, 32 ASIAN‐PAC. ECON. LITERATURE 3, 20 (2018).
59
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expected to exceed US $2.5 trillion in the next ten years.69 The BRI is
estimated to increase global income by 0.7% by 2030.70
Investment in infrastructure is paramount indeed. Innovation, too,
is critical to future growth for China and its companies. 71
Consequentially, the securitzation of IP rights will be of utmost
importance as these massive investments are rolled out.72 The BRI,
69

Editorial Board, ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative Will Define China’s Role as a
World Leader, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 2, 2015, 12:45 AM),
https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1753773/one-belt-one-roadinitiative-will-define-chinas-role-world. A wary U.S. Secretary of Defense James N.
Mattis was critical of the One Belt One Road initiative, reminding us that China has a
historical antecedent to follow:
[T]he Ming Dynasty appears to be their model, albeit in a more
muscular manner, demanding other nations become tribute states,
kowtowing to Beijing; espousing One Belt, One Road, when this
diverse world has many belts and many roads; and attempting to
replicate on the international stage their authoritarian domestic
model, militarizing South China Sea features while using predatory
economics of piling massive debt on others.
James N. Mattis, Sec’y of Def., Remarks at the U.S. Naval War College
Commencement,
Newport,
Rhode
Island
(June
15,
2018),
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1551954/remark
s-by-secretary-mattis-at-the-us-naval-war-college-commencement-newport-rh/.
70
Maryla Maliszewska & Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, The Belt and Road
Initiative: Economic, Poverty and Environmental Impacts 7 (World Bank Grp.,
Working Paper No. 8814, 2019).
71
China’s investment in infrastructure will remain key in its growth and
competitiveness with the U.S.:
[C]hina will remain the top threat to US technological
competitiveness as the CCP targets key technology sectors and
proprietary commercial and military technology from US and allied
companies and research institutions associated with defense, energy,
finance, and other sectors. Beijing uses a variety of tools, from
public investment to espionage and theft, to advance its
technological capabilities.
DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY 7 (2021).
72
China is aware that securitization of IP rights is important:
[I]n the past two years, governments around China have promoted
intellectual property securitization projects and issued supporting
documents to provide policy support. . . . Since 2018, China has
approved and issued more than 20 intellectual property
securitization products, achieving financing of more than 200
billion yuan. . . . At this stage, all localities are actively exploring a
more market-oriented, standardized, replicable and efficient
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through a myriad of bilateral and regional trade and investment
agreements, should fortify IP rights to protect Chinese innovations. For
Peter K. Yu, however, “it remains unclear how the initiative will affect
the country and the world at large in the intellectual property area. To
be sure, there has not been much discussion in academic or
governmental spheres of the BRI in this area.” 73 Certainly,
consideration of IP issues via the BRI has fallen on the backburner as
the main focus of this Chinese-led project has been on the development
of infrastructure.
This is no surprise. China gained entry to the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) as a Member in late 2001.74 It was only in 2007
that the PRC joined the amended Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”), which is part of the WTO
plurilateral agreements.75 When working to update and harmonize its
IP laws, China had a relatively short period of time to achieve
compliance with WTO standards.76 Indeed, the first patent laws in the
business model of intellectual property securitization. Beijing,
Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Suzhou, Foshan, Yantai and other
cities have officially issued intellectual property securitization
projects[.]
Zhao Zhuqin (趙竹勤) & Lv Qian (呂謙), Zhishi Chanquan Zhengquan Hua: Zhuanli
“Bianxian” Pao Chu Jiasu (知識產權證券化：專利“變現”跑出加速) [Intellectual
Property Securitization: Patent "Realization" Ran Out of Acceleration], Renmai
Wangluo ( 人 民 网 ) [PEOPLE.CN] (June 18, 2021, 2:31 PM),
http://ip.people.com.cn/n1/2021/0618/c136655-32134246.html.
73
Peter K. Yu, Building Intellectual Property Infrastructure Along China’s Belt
and Road, 14 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 275, 286 (2019).
74
WTO Ministerial Conference Approves China’s Accession, WORLD TRADE
ORG. (Nov. 10, 2001), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm .
75
Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last visited Oct. 27,
2021).
76
A brief timeline of Chinese revisions:
[I]n 2000 and 2008, China amended its patent law twice, of which
nearly one-third of the content was related to the WTO Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs
Agreement); in 2001 and 2013, China amended its trademark law
twice, adding more than 20 articles in response to the TRIPs
agreement; in 2001 and 2010, China amended the copyright law
twice, refining the specific content of copyright, and made relevant
regulations compatible with WTO regulations.
Sun Di (孫迪), Zhongguo Rushi 15 Nian: Zhishi Chanquan Zhangxian “Zhongguo
Liliang” (中國入世15年：知識 產 權彰顯“中國力量”) [15 Years After China's
Accession to the WTO: Intellectual Property Highlights "Chinese Power"], Zhongguo
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country only came into force in 1985.77 Even with these recent origins
of Chinese trademark law, China has taken historic steps towards the
protection of trademark rights: China entered into the Madrid
Agreement in 1989, and the Madrid Protocol in 1995. 78 China has
utilized the TRIPs just in time to secure the IP rights that are the
backbone of the innovations in which it is investing. In 2017,
[C]hina remained the main driver of global growth in IP
filings. From already high levels, patent filings in China
grew by 14.2% and trademark filing activity in China by
55.2%. These high growth rates propelled China’s
shares of global patent filings and trademarks filing
activity to reach 43.6% and 46.3%, respectively.79
The Trademark Law Implementing Regulations and the Supreme
People’s Court Interpretation of Trademark Disputes, in 2014 and 2016
respectiely, provided guidance to trademark practice in China.80 An
Zhishi Chanquan Bao (中國知識產權報) [CHINA INTELL. PROP. NEWS] (Dec. 16,
2016,
12:30
PM),
http://chinawto.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ap/o/201706/
20170602590144.shtml.
77
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa (中華人民共和國專利法) [Patent
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Apr. 1, 1985), amended by 2008 STANDING
COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ.
78
Notification No. 41, Madrid Agreement Concerning the International
Registration of Marks, Accession by the People’s Republic of China (Jul. 4, 1989),
https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/notifications/madrid-gp/treaty_madrid_gp_41.html;
Notification No. 70, Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the
International Registration of Marks, Entry into Force (Sept. 11, 1995),
https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/notifications/madridp-gp/treaty_madridp_gp_
70.html. The Madrid Agreement and the Madrid Protocol make up the Madrid System
for the International Registration of Marks. This system “makes it possible to protect
a mark in a large number of countries by obtaining an international registration that
has effect in each of the designated Contracting Parties.” Protocol Relating to the
Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, WIPO,
https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/registration/madrid_protocol/ (last visited Nov. 14,
2021).
79
WIPO, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS 5 (2018),
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_941_2018.pdf.
80
See generally Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangbiao Fa Shishi Tiaoli
(中華人民共和國商標法實施條例) [Regulations for the Implementation of the
Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the State Council
of China, Aug. 3, 2002, revised and promulgated by the State Council of China, Apr.
29, 2014, effective May 1, 2014) lawinfochina.com, Apr. 29, 2014,
https://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=17968&lib=law; Zuigao Renmin
Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Zhuanli Qinquan Anjian Shiyong Falu Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi
(Er)
(最高人民法院關於審理專利侵權案件適用法律若干問題的解釋（二）)
[Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the
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article that reported on an interview with Gu Qingyang, Associate
Professor of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National
University of Singapore, stated:
[G]u Qingyang said that strengthening intellectual
property cooperation with partners along the “Belt and
Road” will help improve the international intellectual
property governance system and comprehensively
improve the overall protection level of intellectual
property in relevant countries. [Gu Qingyang explained]
“[t]his is useful for promoting technology and
knowledge sharing between partners. It is of great
significance to promote the construction of a community
with a shared future for mankind.”81
Currently, more than forty countries along the Belt and Road and
SIPO have established formal relations, which has involved “in-depth
cooperation with regional organizations such as the Patent Office of the
Gulf Cooperation Council, [the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations], and the Eurasian Patent Office.”82 Chinese patents have been
upheld in more countries because “WIPO signed an intergovernmental
agreement to strengthen the ‘Belt and Road’ [IP] cooperation[.]”83 In
2020, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement
was formed to encourage “cooperation between China and countries
and regions along the ‘Belt and Road’ in [IP] rights.”84 Gu Qingyang
further explained:
[C]hina’s international trade cooperation with countries
and regions along the [BRI] is becoming closer and
closer. The service industry is an important field for the
joint construction of the [BRI]. The [data referenced in
the article] partly reflects that China promotes the deep
integration of advanced manufacturing and modern
Application of Law in the Trial of Patent Infringement Cases (II)] (promulgated by
the Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 25, 2016, effective Apr. 1, 2016) CCPIT Pat. and
Trademark L. Off., https://www.ccpit-patent.com.cn/node/3219/3218.
81
Liu Hui (劉輝), “Zhongguo zhishi chanquan baohu fangmian qude zhongda
jinzhan” (“中國知識 產 權保護取得重大進展”) [“China has made Significant
Progress in Intellectual Property Protection”], Renmai Wangluo ( 人 民 网 )
[PEOPLE.CN] (May 6, 2021, 11:09 AM), http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2021/0506/
c1002-32095589.html.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
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service industries, accelerates the development of
productive services, and promotes the adjustment and
upgrading of industrial structure.85
But the details of the deals that comprise the BRI are still elusive: “[A]
vast literature produced by official media, academics and think tanks in
China provides explanations of the BRI. This domestic literature of
explanation and interpretation has addressed multiple aspects of the
BRI, yet does not necessarily increase clarity concerning its nature.”86
PRC President Xi Jingping, also the General Secretary of the
Communist Party of China Central Committee, has been a zealous
advocate of IP rights to be registered.87 President Xi has stressed the
importance of strengthening IP protection to stimulate “the vitality of
innovation and foster a new development paradigm.” 88 During a
discussion of IP protection in 2020, President Xi stated:
[I]t is necessary to deepen cooperation with countries
and regions along the “Belt and Road” in the joint
construction of intellectual property rights, and promote
knowledge sharing. . . . As I said, external transfer of
intellectual property rights must adhere to the overall
national security concept. It is necessary to strengthen
independent research and development and protection of
key core technologies related to national security, and to
manage the transfer of intellectual property rights related
to national security in accordance with the law. It is
necessary to improve laws, regulations, and policy
85

Id.
Freeman, supra note 53, at 121.
87
See Matt Ho, Chinese President Xi Jinping Says Intellectual Property
Protection Is Key Part of Country’s Develoment Plans, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb.
2, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3120118/
chinese-president-xi-jinping-says-intellectual-property; see also Xi Jingping Calls for
Intellectual Property Protection to Stimulate Innovation, CGTN html (Jan. 31, 2021,
8:50 PM), https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-01-31/Xi-s-article-on-intellectualproperty-protection-to-be-published-XuZZHgXh60/index.html.
88
Xi Jujiao: Xi Fabiao Zhishi Chanquan Baohu Wenzhang
(習聚焦：習發表知識 產 權保護文章) [Xi Focus: Xi’s Article on Intellectual
Property Rights Protection to be Published], Xinhua Wang (新華網) [XINHUANET]
(Jan.
31,
2021,
7:26
PM),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/202101/31/c_139711081.htm. But cf. Aaron Wininger, China’s President Xi Jinping
Throws His Support Behind an Intellectual Property Rights Waiver for COVID
Vaccines, NAT’L L. REV. (May 26, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/
china-s-president-xi-jinping-throws-his-support-behind-intellectual-property-rights
(stating that President Xi supports the initiative to waive IP rights of COVID-19
vaccines).
86

2021

GAMES WITHOUT FRONTIERS

62

measures related to intellectual property anti-monopoly
and fair competition, and form legitimate and powerful
restraints. It is necessary to promote the extraterritorial
application of China's intellectual property laws and
regulations, and improve cross-border judicial
coordination arrangements. It is necessary to form an
efficient early warning and emergency response
mechanism for international intellectual property risks,
build a system for preventing and controlling intellectual
property foreign-related risks, and increase assistance
for overseas intellectual property rights protection of
Chinese enterprises.89
III. MOVING FROM A PRODUCER SOCIETY TOWARD A CONSUMER
SOCIETY: THE CHANGING DEMANDS OF THE
CHINESE DOMESTIC MARKET
If China is to reap the benefits from its burgeoning global trade
network, the country must continue to grow as an innovation exporter.
However, the Chinese will also have to be consumers of these
innovations. In an effort to boost domestic consumption, the State
Council approved a new guideline on improving consumer goods
standards and quality on August 24, 2016, which was initiated by the
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and
Quarantine. 90 Premier Li Keqiang said, “[g]overnment departments
should enhance coordination, while enterprises need to have stronger
emphasis on quality, branding, R&D and marketing. They also need to
create mass awareness on branding.”91
While realizing the weakness of domestic production, Premier Li
also stressed that “[i]t is important that the quality of consumer goods
made in China can withstand the test of the market.”92 There is risk of
the “boomerang effect” in China, like in India, wherein “[t]he impact of
more than two billion consumers wanting more—more foodstuffs,
water, housing, transport, luxury goods, education, and healthcare—
89
Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, Strengthen Intellectual
Property Protection Comprehensively, Stimulate Innovation Vitality and Promote the
Construction of a New Development Pattern, CHINA INTELL. PROP. JUD. PROT.
NETWORK (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.chinaiprlaw.cn/index.php?id=5664.
90
Zhang Yue (張越), Zhongguo Fabu Xin Guize Yi Tigao Xiaofeipin Zhi Liang
(中國發布新規則以提高消費品質量) [China Issues New Rules to Improve Quality
of Consumer Goods], Zhengfu Wangluo (政府网) [GOV.CN] (Aug. 25, 2016, 10:11
PM), http://english.gov.cn/premier/news/2016/08/25/content281475425704697.htm.
91
Id.
92
Id.
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will be inflation in supply-constrained commodities, price volatility,
scarcity of some resources, and hypercompetition to meet consumers’
needs.”93
Increasingly, the Chinese want the real thing, not knock offs,
counterfeits, or fake products. “China’s share of the global luxury
goods market was about 32 percent in 2020.”94 An estimated one-third
of global spending on high-end goods will occur in China.95 Moving
forward, IP rights will surely grow in importance, and not just for the
consumption of luxury brands. The ascending middle class also
requires products that deliver technical, functional, and emotional
benefits,along with aspirational products that seemed—just a few years
ago—out of reach. In addition,
[T]hree great forces are ushering in this transformation
[of the Chinese consumer market]: the rise of the uppermiddle-class and affluent households as the drivers of
consumption growth; a new generation of freerspending, sophisticated consumers; and the increasingly
powerful role of e-commerce. Research by The Boston
Consulting Group and AliResearch, the research arm of
Alibaba, China’s largest e-commerce company, found
that these three forces of change will profoundly reshape
China’s economy and consumer market over the next
five years. Through 2020, 81% of consumption growth
will come from households whose annual income is
more than $24,000. Furthermore, consumers 35 or
younger will account for 65% of growth. E-commerce
will become a far more important retail channel, driving
42% of total consumption growth, 90% of that growth
coming from mobile e-commerce.96

93

MICHAEL J. SILVERSTEIN ET AL., THE $10 TRILLION PRIZE: CAPTIVATING THE
NEWLY AFFLUENT IN CHINA AND INDIA at xv (2012).
94
Cyril Ip, China’s Luxury Goods Market: How Big is it, and What Impact has
the Coronavirus Pandemic Had?, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 6, 2021, 2:30
PM), https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3154985/chinasluxury-goods-market-how-big-it-and-what-impact-has.
95
Bruce Einhorn et al., Online Shopping in China Goes Luxury, With Men in
Black Delivering Hermes, BLOOMBERG (May 20, 2019, 11:12 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-16/china-s-112-billion-luxurygoods-market-is-shifting-online.
96
Jeff Walters et al., The New China Playbook: Young, Affluent, E-Savvy
Consumers Will Fuel Growth, BOS. CONSULTING GRP. (Dec. 21, 2015),
https://www.bcg.com/publications/2015/globalization-growth-new-china-playbookyoung-affluent-e-savvy-consumers.aspx.
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As China moves from producer to consumer in its economic growth,
brand awareness and brand protection will take on even greater
importance. 97 When products have a patent or trademark or an
indication of a patent pending, they are likely of higher quality.98 This
is a signal of an emerging consumer society.99 According to McKinsey
& Company, Chinese consumers “continue to increase their spending
by a considerable margin and are eager to pay for items with a strong
value proposition.”100
China’s strengthening consumer marketplace was facilitated by a
proliferating online economy.101 In 2018, it was estimated that over 800
million people in the country took part in electronic commerce.102 As
97
STEPHEN ROACH, UNBALANCED: THE CODEPENDENCY OF AMERICA AND
CHINA 156 (2014).
98
See generally HEFA SONG & ZHENXING LI, PATENT QUALITY AND THE
MEASURING INDICATOR SYSTEM: COMPARISON AMONG CHINA’S PROVINCES AND
KEY COUNTRIES (2014), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Song_Hefa_IPSC_
paper_2014.pdf.
99
See Andrew Sheng (安德魯·盛) & Xiao Geng (小庚), Zhongguo Xiaofei Zhe
Shehui De Xingcheng (中國消費者社會的形成) [The Making of China’s Consumer
Society], Zhongguo Ribao (中國日報) [CHINA DAILY] (Sept. 5, 2016, 7:27 AM),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2016-09/05/content_26697254.htm.
100
JOHNNY HO ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., CHINA CONSUMER REPORT 2020: THE
MANY FACES OF THE CHINESE CONSUMER 3 (2019).
101
Regarding China’s online economy:

[C]hina’s total digital economy ranks second in the world and has
become an important source of leading global digital economy
innovation. In 2020, the added value of China's digital economy
core industries accounted for 7.8% of GDP. The scale of digital
industrialization continues to grow. Software business revenue has
increased from 4.9 trillion yuan in 2016 to 8.16 trillion yuan in 2020.
. . . China’s e-commerce transaction volume has increased from 21.8
trillion yuan in 2015 to 37.2 trillion yuan in 2020. Information
consumption is booming. From 2015 to 2020, the scale of China's
information consumption increased from 3.4 trillion yuan to 5.8
trillion yuan. . . . In 2020, China’s national online retail sales
reached 11.76 trillion yuan, ranking first in the world for eight
consecutive years. Among them, the online retail sales of physical
goods was 9.76 trillion yuan, accounting for nearly a quarter of the
total retail sales of consumer goods.
Guojia Hulianwang Xinxi Bangongshi Fabu “Shuzi Zhongguo Fazhan Baogao
2020”
(國家互聯網信息辦公室發布《數字中國發展報告2020》)
[National
Internet Information Office Released the Digital China Development Report 2020],
Zhongguo Wangluo Kongjian Guanli Ju (中國網絡空間管理局) [CYBERSPACE
ADMIN. OF CHINA] (July 2, 2021, 6:55 PM), http://www.cac.gov.cn/202106/28/c_1626464503226700.htm.
102
Niall McCarthy, China Now Boasts More than 800 Million Internet Users and
98% of Them Are Mobile [Infographic], FORBES (Aug. 23, 2018, 7:30 AM),
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an example of the oversized role that online commerce plays in China,
consider the effects of its annual Singles’ Day, an event like Black
Friday in the U.S., during which online retailers slash prices.103 This
online extravaganza turns China’s bachelor crisis into an economic
windfall. 104 In 2021, consumers set a new record of US $139.1
billion.105 To demonstrate how impressive these Chinese results were,
note that in the U.S., sales on Black Friday in 2021 totaled $8.9
billion. 106 Cyber Monday in the U.S. on November 29, 2021, saw
online transactions reach $10.7 billion.107
https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2018/08/23/china-now-boasts-morethan-800-million-internet-users-and-98-of-them-are-mobileinfographic/#59305f647092. In early 2021, China released a report with metrics on
China’s internet development status:
[S]ince 2013, China has become the world's largest online retail
market for eight consecutive years. In 2020, China’s online retail
sales reached 11.76 trillion yuan, an increase of 10.9% over 2019.
Among them, the online retail sales of physical goods was 9.76
trillion yuan, accounting for 24.9% of the total retail sales of
consumer goods. As of December 2020, the number of online
shopping users in China has reached 782 million, an increase of
72.15 million from March 2020, accounting for 79.1% of the total
Internet users. . . . As of December 2020, the number of online
payment users in China has reached 854 million, an increase of
86.36 million from March 2020, accounting for 86.4% of the total
Internet users.
Zhongguo Hulianwang Luo Xinxi Zhongxin Fabu Di 47 Ci Zhongguo Hulianwang
Luo
Fazhan
Zhuangkuang
Tongji
Baogao
(中國互聯網絡信息中心發布第47次中國互聯網絡發展狀況統計報告) [CNNIC
Releases the 47th Statistical Report on China's Internet Development Status],
Zhongguo Wangluo Kongjian Guanli Ju (中國網絡空間管理局) [CYBERSPACE
ADMIN. OF CHINA] (Feb. 3, 2021, 9:00 AM), http://www.cac.gov.cn/202102/03/c_1613923422728645.htm.
103
Xin En Lee, The World’s Biggest Shopping Holiday Is in China—Not the US.
Here’s How Singles Day Became No. 1, CNBC (Dec. 4, 2018, 3:05 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/04/how-chinas-singles-day-became-the-worldsbiggest-shopping-holiday.html.
104
Id.
105
Zen Soo, Chinese Shoppers Spend $139 Billion During Singles’ Day Fest, U.S.
NEWS (Nov. 12, 2021, 5:40 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/
2021-11-11/chinas-singles-day-shopping-extravaganza-loses-luster.
106
Emma Roth, Online Spending on Black Friday Decreased for the Very First
Time,
VERGE
(Nov.
28,
2021,
12:39
PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2021/11/28/22806233/black-friday-online-spendingdecreased-first-time?mc_cid=ba8774d208&mc_eid=f885456765.
107
Lauren Thomas, Cyber Monday Sales Drop 1.4% From Last Year to $10.7
Billion,
Falling
for
the
First
Time
Ever,
CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/30/cyber-monday-online-sales-drop-1point4percent-
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Business consultants have predicted that “Chinese children born
today will consume nearly thirty-eight times as much as their
grandparents did[.]”108 Yet, in the 1970s and 1980s, the Chinese had to
use ration tickets to buy almost all daily necessities from state-run
stores.109 This was only a few decades after mass starvation gripped the
country during its forced agicultural collectivation polices.110 Shopping
in those bygone eras was merely a means of survival.111 The Chinese
are a far cry away from that now as shopping has become a form of
entertainment.112 A joint report from the World Economic Forum and
Bain & Company estimated that $8.2 trillion of consumption will occur
in China by 2027.113 According to McKinsey & Company,
[T]he overall pace at which Chinese consumption has
grown is almost hard to imagine: Just a decade ago, most
urban Chinese had enough money to cover basic needs
like food, clothes, and housing (92 percent had annual
household disposable incomes of 140,000 renminbi or
less). Today, half are living in relatively well-to-do
households (annual disposable incomes of 140,000–
300,000 renminbi) where they have ample funds for
perks like regular meals out, beauty products, flat screen
TVs, and holiday travel.114
A Chinese consumer society should indeed improve the lives of
hundreds of millions of people, and spread benefits of the industrial
boom that began in the 1980s beyond the country’s eastern coast.115
from-last-year-to-10point7-billion-falling-for-the-first-time-ever.html (Nov. 30,
2021, 8:29 PM).
108
SILVERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 93, at xiii.
109
Cindy Sui, What the World’s Largest Shopping Day Says About China, BBC
(Nov. 11, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41954591.
110
Brian Palmer, Why Does China Not Have Famines Anymore?, SLATE (Apr. 2,
2014, 8:31 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2014/04/why-does-china-not-havefamines-anymore-capitalist-and-socialist-reforms.html.
111
See Sui, supra note 109.
112
See id.
113
FUTURE OF CONSUMPTION IN FAST-GROWTH CONSUMER MARKETS: CHINA,
BAIN & CO. (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.bain.com/insights/future-of-consumptionin-fast-growth-consumer-markets-wef/.
114
HO, supra note 100, at 4.
115
Andrew Sheng (安德魯·盛) & Xiao Geng (小庚), Zhongguo Xiaofei Zhe
Shehui De Xingcheng (中國消費者社會的形成) [The Making of China’s Consumer
Society], Zhongguo Ribao (中國日報) [CHINA DAILY] (Sept. 5, 2016, 7:27 AM),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2016-09/05/content_26697254.htm; Tomas
Hirst, A Brief History of China’s Economic Growth, WORLD ECON. F. (July 30, 2015),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/07/brief-history-of-china-economic-growth/.
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This expansion underscores why many countries in the G-20 have for
years encouraged the Chinese to consume more. 116 And with more
focus on consumers and less on export-led growth, the service sector
will naturally grow as well. 117 Factories that offer employment but
spew pollution are to be balanced by services like education, financial
services, insurance, entertainment, and health and beauty, among
others.118 Many of these industries require innovation and, thus, the
development and protection of IP rights will be of utmost importance.
When looking to the U.S. economy’s shift from manufacturing-based to
services-based posture for guidance, the importance of IP rights
becomes clear. In 1975, 80% of the market value of the S&P 500 was
comprised of physical assets (plant, property, and equipment). 119
However, today “the majority of market value is made up of intangible
assets (networks, platforms, intellectual property, customer
relationships, big data) more than physical assets. In fact, it’s not even
close: intangible assets make up over 80% of the S&P 500’s market
value—a complete reversal from 1975.”120
This exponential market value increase occurred as the technology
industry grew. 121 It was likely garnered by licensing, royalties, and
other rents that were drawn by corporations from their trading partners.
According to the International Chamber of Commerce: “In many
companies even now, 80% or more of their market value is attributable
to intangibles, including IP. In some small companies, the only value
116

See Maria Elena Spagnolo (), Caifang: Zhongguo Zai G20 Fenghui Shang De
Zuoyong Dui Quanqiu Zengzhang Zhi Guan Zhongyao: Yidali Zhuanjia
(採訪：中國在
G20
峰會上的作用對全球增長至關重要：意大利專家)
[Interview: China’s Role in G20 Summit Vital to Global Growth: Italian Expert],
Xinhua Wang ( 新 華 網 ) [XINHUANET] (Aug. 9, 2016, 7:28 AM),
http://english.cctv.com/2016/08/09/ARTIak2ZKVhi7cDxcoBUkxVq160809.shtml
(“China’s growth helps other countries’ growth.”).
117
See BAIN & COMPANY, supra note 113 (stating that one of the four major
drivers shaping consumption in China over the next decade includes China’s economy
migrating from an investment-driven model to a consumption- and services-driven
model).
118
See Sheng, supra note 115 (noting that China’s transformation away from a
manufacturing-driven and export-led economy to instead one that is underpinned by
services and domestic consumption is already firmly underway).
119
Barry Libert et al., Why Leaders Are Still so Hesitant to Invest in New Business
Models, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 21, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/12/why-leaders-arestill-so-hesitant-to-invest-in-new-business-models.
120
Id.
121
See generally Jenna Ross, Intangible Assets: A Hidden but Crucial Driver of
Company
Value,
VISUAL
CAPITALIST
(Feb.
11,
2020),
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/intangible-assets-driver-company-value/ (showing
the dramatic changes over many decades of intangible assets, their growth, and what
that can be attributed to).
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is the intellectual property they own in an exciting new innovation that
they have developed.”122
IP rights—as intangible assets—are becoming increasingly
tradable, and are used to secure capital and encourage investment in
research and development.123 For instance, a small start-up may use its
properly-secured IP rights to prevent competition and may also use its
IP rights defensively when accused of IP infringement.124 In the U.S.,
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that a company
may put up its IP rights as collateral to secure financing, which can then
be sold upon default to cover the creditor’s losses.125 Nevertheless, IP
rights do not always benefit a society still growing its businesses. Small
businesses may be adversely impacted by international IP laws and
agreements.126 To illustrate, the research and design costs associated
with ensuring non-infringing use in business branding and product
development, and the potential necessity of license fee payments to an
IP owner, may create an insurmountable financial hurdle to the small
business.127 This, in turn, may thwart some entrepreneurs from starting
their business, “which [then] lowers the potential for job creation by
small businesses.”128 As a former President of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce aptly remarked: “IP is critical to public safety and consumer
confidence. In other words, strong IP protections and enforcement are
important to preventing dangerous products—such as counterfeit
pharmaceuticals or toys—from getting into consumers’ hands.
Trademarks give customers confidence that they are buying genuine,
high-quality products from brands they trust.”129
Take medicine for example: “Across the globe, counterfeit
medicines are a major threat to public health and safety.” 130 Every
region of the world is affected by counterfeit medical products, which
122

ALLEN N. DIXON, INT’L CHAMBER OF COM., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
POWERHOUSE FOR INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 2 (2011).
123
ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., EUR. UNION INTELL. PROP. OFF., TRADE IN
COUNTERFEIT AND PIRATED GOODS: MAPPING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT 25–27 (2016).
124
Bryant Lee et al., IP strategy: How Should Startups Decide Whether to File
Patents, TECHCRUNCH+ (July 3, 2019, 10:03 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/
07/03/ip-strategy-how-should-startups-decide-whether-to-file-patents/.
125
Kyle Tondo-Kramer, Comment, Increasing Access to Startup Financing
Through Intellectual Property Securitization, 27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUT. & INFO. L.
613, 615 (2010).
126
See generally Leah Chan Grinvald, Resolving the IP Disconnect for Small
Businesses, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1491 (2012).
127
Id. at 1500–01.
128
Id. at 1501.
129
Thomas J. Donohue, Intellectual Property Has Huge Impact on Society, U.S.
CHAMBER OF COM. (Nov. 17, 2014, 9:00 AM), https://www.uschamber.com/
above-the-fold/intellectual-property-has-huge-impact-society.
130
James M. Cooper, Piracy 101, 36 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 89, 90 (2005).
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are available in illegal street markets, on unregulated websites, and in
pharmacies and medical facilities.131 Some “counterfeit medicines can,
in theory, be of high-quality, perfectly safe, and efficacious.” 132
However, generally, counterfeit medical products are especially
dangerous to public health because they are ineffective to cure or
combat the medical ailment for which the medicine is used, or worse,
further harm the patient where the product contains contaminants or
toxic components. 133 Continued and widespread availability of
counterfeit medical products leads to distrust in healthcare, including in
medicines and medical providers.134
Securitization of IP rights promotes product safety and public
security. Counterfeit foods and other consumables cause a host of
problems, including customer confusion as to the true good offered by
the mark holder, damage to the mark holder’s reputation, physical harm
to the consumer because of harmful agents or unregulated production,
and lost profits from sales diversion.135
IP is also an incentive for innovations that enhance and improve
lives. When artists, inventors, or scientists have assurances that their
works are protected and rewarded by IP rights, they are more inclined
or able to produce. With strong copyright laws, musicians are more
likely to record new albums. Likewise, “[p]atent protections enable
pharmaceutical companies to take on the costs and challenges of putting
lifesaving new drugs on the market. Without opportunities for
ownership or profit, the incentive to innovate falls.” 136 In short, IP
rights protect innovation too. “[I]nadequate IPR protection and
enforcement in foreign markets discourages entry into technology
transfer arrangements and broader investment in those markets.” 137
China has realized the importance of innovation and IP rights. Indeed,
“intellectual property protection is a significant determinant of
economic growth.”138
131
Substandard and Falsified Medical Products, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO]
(Jan. 31, 2018), http://www.who.int/entity/mediacentre/factsheets/fs275/en/.
132
Jonathan Liberman, Combating Counterfeit Medicines and Illicit Trade in
Tobacco Products: Minefields in Global Health Governance, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
326, 329 (2012).
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
See Laura Zanzig, The Perfect Pairing: Protecting U.S. Geographical
Indications with a Sino-American Wine Registry, 88 WASH. L. REV. 723, 724 (2013).
136
DONOHUE, supra note 129.
137
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2016 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 25 (2016),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR-2016-Special-301-Report.pdf.
138
David M. Gould & William C. Gruben, The Role of Intellectual Property
Rights in Economic Growth, 48 J. DEV. ECON. 323, 323 (1996); cf. E. Richard Gold et
al., Does Intellectual Property Lead to Economic Growth? Insights from an Improved
IP
Data
Set,
REGUL.
&
GOVERNANCE
(May
31,
2017),

2021

GAMES WITHOUT FRONTIERS

70

IV. MOVING FROM THE SMOKESTACK ECONOMY TOWARD THE
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY: THE VALUE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND CHINA’S RECORD
IP rights are based on knowledge.139 Inexpensive manual labor has
fueled much of China’s growth over the last three decades.140 IP also
derives from innovation,141 which in turn results from good educational
systems and a focus on invention rather than manual labor. 142
Investments in R&D have become increasingly important as part of the
national strategy for economic development.143 As Premier Li Keqiang
stressed in his annual speech to the National People’s Congress in 2017,
“[w]e will accelerate [R&D] on and commercialization of new
materials, artificial intelligence, integrated circuits, bio-pharmacy, 5G
mobile communications and other technologies, and develop industrial
clusters in these fields.”144
IP protection is a fundamental part of economic reform for postindustrial and knowledge-based economies. It ensures a safe supply
chain for pharmaceuticals, herbals, medical procedures, fully tested and
approved medical devices, and other life-enhancing innovations. It also
requires the provision of authentic products for the consumer society,
which in turn garners tax dollars to the government’s revenue
authorities, wages to workers, and profits to the owners of innovations.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2978025 (“IP leads to greater
levels of technology transfer and increased domestic inventive activity.”).
139
Cohen, supra note 2, at 698.
140
“Li Tie, an expert on China’s urbanization development issues, pointed out at
the Tianjin Davos Forum that the biggest feature of China’s economic growth in the
past 30 years is that it has become the world’s factory[,]” but since its development,
this era of artificially cheap costs has passed. Chen Zhifen (陳志芬), Fagaiwei
Zhuanjia: Zhongguo Lianjia Laodongli Shidai Yijing Jieshu (發改委專家：中國廉
價勞動力時代已經結束) [National Development and Reform Commission Experts:
The Era of Cheap Labor Costs in China is Over], Yīngguó Guǎngbò Gōngsī De
Xīnwén
(英國廣播公司的新聞)
[BBC
NEWS]
(Sept.
12,
2014),
https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2014/09/140912_china_cheap_labour_g
one.
141
See Innovation and Intellectual Property, WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/ipoutreach/en/ipday/2017/innovation_and_intellectual_property.html (last visited Oct.
27, 2021).
142
See Barbara Biasi et al., Education and Innovation 5–6 (NBER, Working
Paper No. w28544, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3804538.
143
Smriti Mallapaty, China’s Five-Year Plan Focuses on Scientific Self-Reliance,
NATURE (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-00638-3.
144
Keith Bradsher & Paul Mozur, China’s Plan to Build Its Own High-Tech
Industries Worries Western Businesses, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/business/china-trade-manufacturingeurope.html.
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There must be protection of IP rights to provide incentives to create
further inventions and other advances that can create revenue streams.
China has a great deal to gain if it continues to increase its protection
of IP rights. The revenues to be extracted from the rapid growth of the
country’s knowledge-based economy is unlimited as it transitions away
from an assembly line-based economy. Indeed, IP rights protection will
matter more and more to China, given that the leading Chinese
corporations are among the world’s largest filers of international
applications for the protection of IP rights.
The post-industrial, knowledge-based global economy continues to
grow in leaps and bounds. According to WIPO’s World Intellectual
Property Indicators 2020 Report, China filed 1.4 million patents in
2019, which accounted for 43.4% of the world’s total patent
applications that year.145 In context, Chinese filings accounted for more
than twice the number of filings in the U.S. for the same year.146 China
accounted for an even larger percentage of total filings in utility models
(96.9%), trademarks (51.7%), and industrial designs (52.3%) in the
world.147 As of 2019, China surpassed the U.S. as the leading country
globally in filing international patent applications under the Patent
Cooperation Treaty (“PCT”).148
In 2020, the number of applications filed by the two major users of
the PCT system, China and the U.S., both achieved annual growth.149
145

Alex He, What Do China’s High Patent Numbers Really Mean?, CTR. FOR
INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.cigionline.org/
articles/what-do-chinas-high-patent-numbers-really-mean/.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Press Release, WIPO, Innovation Perseveres: International Patent Filings via
WIPO Continued to Grow in 2020 Despite COVID-19 Pandemic, WIPO Press
Release 2021/874 (Mar. 2, 2021), https://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2021/
article_0002.html. Regarding China’s growth in patent filings,
[I]n an interview, Gu Qingyang, Associate Professor of the Lee
Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of
Singapore, said that in recent years, China has made significant
progress in the protection of intellectual property rights. The
intellectual property legal system has been increasingly improving,
and the number of patent applications has maintained a leading
position. It has gradually become a global intellectual property
power.
Liu Hui (劉輝), “Zhongguo Zai Zhishi Chanquan Baohu Fangmian Qude Zhongda
Jinzhan” (“中國在知識產權保護方面取得重大進展”) [“China has made Significant
Progress in the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights”], Renmai Wangluo (人民
网) [PEOPLE.CN] (May 6, 2021, 11:09 AM), http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2021/
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Among them, China continued to rank as the largest user of the PCT
system with total applications of 68,720; followed by the U.S. with
59,230 applications; Japan’s applications amounted to 50,520; South
Korea’s applications amounted to 20,060; and Germany’s applications
amounted to 18,643. 150 There were strong numbers of international
patent applications in other countries as well, including Saudi Arabia
(956 applications), Malaysia (255 applications), Chile (262
applications), Singapore (1,278 applications), and Brazil (697
applications). 151
In the context of company-specific patent
applications, in 2020 China’s “Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. became
the largest applicant in the PCT system with 5,464 applications for the
fourth consecutive year.” 152 Following Huawei are South Korea’s
Samsung Electronics (3,093 applications), Japan’s Mitsubishi Electric
Corporation (2,810 applications), South Korea’s LG Electronics (2,759
applications) and Qualcomm (2,173 applications).153
However, the quality of China’s patents has been deemed low,154 or
the “soft belly of the seeming patent giant of China.”155 In fact, some
critics even claim these patents are worthless.156 A reported nine in ten
patents lapse in the application stage.157 It is inaccurate to only use
patent application numbers to measure the value of patents and the
strength of innovation, because it is also closely related to patent types,
patent licenses, and international patent applications. Generally, patents
are divided into three categories: invention patents, design patents, and
utility model patents.158 “Among them, the value of invention patents
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150
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is much higher than the other two types of patents, and they are also
more representative of innovation strength.”159
According to statistical analysis of patent applications in the U.S.,
the United Kingdom, Japan, France, and Germany from 1978 to 2017
by Chinese patent data, 90.43% of the patent applications in the U.S.
are invention patents, 72.27% are invention patents in the United
Kingdom, 82.92% in Japan, 68.81% in France, and 80.5% in
Germany.160 However, the invention patents in China only accounted
for 35.53%, and invalid patents accounted for 48.75% of all patents.161
Nevertheless, China still leads in absolute numbers of patent
applications. WIPO’s 2020 World Intellectual Property Indicators
Report covers more than 150 countries and regions around the world.162
According to this report, in 2019 SIPO received 1.4 million patent
applications, a decrease of 9.2% compared with 2018.163 This is the
first decline in the past twenty-four years, 164 mainly as a result of
China’s regulatory transformation to optimize the application structure
and improve the application quality.165 Although the worldwide actual
number of patent applications has decreased, China received the highest
number of applications in the world—more than twice the number of
621,453 applications received by the U.S., the country with the second
highest number.166 Japan, South Korea, and Europe ranked third to fifth
with 307,969, 218,975, and 181,479 applications, respectively.167 The
applications received by China, U.S., Japan, South Korea, and Europe
combined accounted for 84.7% of the global total in 2019.168 The 2020
World Intellectual Property Indicators Report observed that:
[F]iling patent applications abroad is a major signal of
intention to expand the market overseas. In 2019, U.S.
residents filed a total of 236,032 equivalent patent
applications overseas, and continued to maintain a
world-leading position in this field, followed by Japan
(206,758), Germany (104,736), China (84,279 cases)
Become Number One in the World], Tai Jiezhi (鈦介質) [TMTPOST] (Apr. 10, 2020),
https://www.tmtpost.com/4308716.html.
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and South Korea (76,824 cases).169
Finally, regarding IP rights related to patents, “according to
statistics from the Ministry of Commerce, the State Administration of
Foreign Exchange and the International Monetary Fund, China’s
international intellectual property revenue in 2015 was only $1.08
billion U.S. dollars, while the United States was as high as $124.67
billion U.S. dollars, 115 times that of China.”170
China has also proliferated its trademark registration activity: “[I]n
2019, the IP office of China accounted for 55.7% of the annual increase
in global trademark filing activity using this measure, albeit down from
the exceptionally high shares of between 73% and 84% it comprised
each year from 2016 to 2018.”171 China also dominates in industrial
designs: “The office of China accounted for 52.3% of designs in
applications filed worldwide in 2019, representing 711,617 designs.
[The Chinese office] was followed by the European Union Intellectual
Property Office (EUIPO) (113,319), the Republic of Korea (69,360),
the United States of America (U.S.) (49,848) and Turkey (46,202).”172
Notwithstanding these impressive numbers that demonstrate
creative activity and a culture of filing applications to protect its IP,
there are a number of challenges facing China’s attempts to prioritize
such IP rights protection. First, the country has long enforced capital
controls, which restricts the ability of businesses and individuals to
transfer funds in and out of the country.173 While capital controls may
help prevent huge economic swings as investment in China peaks and
ebbs, it is not conducive for an environment oriented towards IP rights
protections.174 China’s export policy has served as the country’s main
economic development strategy as it uses market interventions and
capital controls to keep its currency undervalued relative to
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fundamentals—at least until recent times.175
Keeping a low value for the renminbi maintains a low price for
Chinese-made goods in other countries. 176 It also forces increased
prices for foreign-made products in China—more than they would
otherwise be with a free-floating currency. 177 In effect, China’s
government has deliberately reduced the purchasing power of its own
consumers in order to subsidize the country’s exporters. This policy
may not work in a knowledge-based economy that is dependent on
extracting rents for innovations outside China, nor will it help the fight
against counterfeit copies of foreign products as a low-cost Chinese
currency makes foreign luxury goods very expensive and thus prey to
piracy.178
Second, China’s attempts to prioritize IP rights protection is
simultaneously undermined by the country’s renewed efforts to steal
industrial secrets from U.S. corporations.179 The Commission on the
Theft of American Intellectual Property—an independent and bipartisan
initiative of leading Americans from the private sector, public sector,
national security and foreign affairs, academia, and politics—reported
on the surge of research that demonstrates renewed efforts by Chinese
authorities and its private sector to steal U.S. IP.180 The United States
Trade Representatives’s 2021 Special 301 Report details China’s
175

See WORLD BANK GROUP [WBG], CHINA ECONOMIC UPDATE: FISCAL
POLICIES FOR REBALANCING 7 (2018), http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/917591545
202039807/CEU-Dec-2018-EN.pdf.
176
See CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32165, CHINA’S CURRENCY: ECONOMIC ISSUES
AND OPTIONS FOR U.S. TRADE POLICY 25 (2008); see also Fred Imbert, Trump Accuses
China of ‘Currency Manipulation’ as Yuan Drops to Lowest Level in More than a
Decade, CNBC (Aug. 5, 2019, 12:59 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/05/trumpaccuses-china-of-currency-manipulation-as-yuan-drops-to-new-low.html;
Karen
Yeung, China Kept on US Currency Manipulator Watch List Amid Sharp Fall in US
Dollar-Yuan Exchange Rate, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 17, 2020, 6:01 PM),
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3114365/us-keeps-chinacurrency-manipulator-watch-list-trade-surplus.
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continued practice of allowing its companies to steal U.S. IP rights.181
In July 2021, the White House, accompanied by allies in the European
Union, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Canada condemned
cyberattacks on Microsoft servers by hackers based in China.182
These allegations continue notwithstanding the Chinese
government’s commitment that protection of foreign IP rights is a
priority.183 In a keynote speech at the opening of the Second Belt and
Road Forum for International Cooperation in April 2019, President Xi
promised that China would strengthen the protection of the legitimate
rights and interests of foreign IP owners.184 This promise, along with
encouraging foreign investment and purchasing more goods and
services from abroad, were part of a new trade deal that negotiators from
the U.S. and PRC almost agreed to sign in May of 2019.185 However,
the deal dissolved when Chinese negotiators sent their U.S. counterparts
a redrafted agreement, prompting former President Trump to accuse
Beijing of reneging on terms that had been settled and ordering the
imposition of new tariffs against Chinese goods.186 Again, President
Trump blamed China for violating IP laws.187
181
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The theft of U.S. IP became the justification for the tariff war in
which the U.S. and China engaged in 2018 and 2019.188 These issues
were not resolved by the January 2020 trade deal between the U.S. and
China.189 Phase I of a January 2020 Trade Agreement only reversed
some of the tariffs that each country imposed on the other since 2017.190
The tariffs on $120 billion of Chinese goods are to be halved to 7.5%
and new tariffs will be suspended.191 But not all new tariffs will be
deferred. In fact, U.S. tariffs on $370 billion worth of goods, threequarters of the total amount of U.S. tariffs imposed, remain in place.192
The deal did commit China to purchasing many more U.S. agricultural
goods going forward, 193 a great benefit for America’s agricultural
sector. While such purchase promises from China have been largely
unfulfilled,194 the deal helped the trading partners move back towards
pre-trade war economic relations to some extent.195
Phase I of the January 2020 trade deal between the two countries
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also did not address IP rights violations.196 Instead, it was left to a Phase
II, a deal which never materialized during the Trump administration.197
Phase II was stillborn so the real structural and difficult issues 198 —
including IP protections—that have rankled the U.S. government and
its corporations for years remain unresolved.199 China’s state subsidies
for its massive technology companies, like Tencent, Huawei and
Baidu200 have long been a bone in the throat of Washington, D.C., and
U.S-based Big Tech. 201 With no Phase II, Beijing can continue its
economic, military, and political support of its state-owned enterprises,
ensuring its dominance over emerging technologies.202 Currently, the
great decoupling of the two global superpowers is underway.203 The
global supply chain—including the cheap Chinese parts on which U.S.
technology manufacturing relies—is being disrupted and global trade
196
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braces for more shocks as relations between the two competitors
strain.204
At the week-long 19th National Congress of the Communist Party
of China in 2017, 205 President Xi Jinping declared a “new era” of
Chinese socialism. 206 In this “new era,” the principal contradiction
facing China is “between unbalanced and inadequate development and
the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life. That indicates the
country will not only continue its economic development but also pay
more attention to its social development.”207 As he hailed the “China
Dream,” President Xi Jinping warned achieving it would be “no walk
in the park.”208 He then outlined the Party’s priorities for the next five
years.209 Among the various goals the country has to achieve within
that timeframe, President Xi Jinping emphasized the urgency of
establishing an innovative and creative country.210
V. CONCLUSION
With China building its IP portfolio and infrastructure to protect it,
it is important to remember that China first used marks to designate the
origin of goods 3,000 years when marks were placed on pottery. 211
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States Period. The embryonic form of this trademark was 800 years
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Currently, due to several moving parts in China such as the BRI, the
emerging consumer society, and the transition to a knowledge-based
economy, protecting IP rights has become increasingly important.
By protecting IP rights, the Chinese government and its regulators
will provide a steady stream of revenue for rightsholders, an attendant
stream of tax revenue for the government itself, and continued
incentives for further R&D that will contribute to the knowledgeeconomy comparative advantage that China is sure to gain in the future.
According to Xinhua News Agency, China will improve IP protection
for foreign companies by launching campaigns against violations and
stepping up judicial and administrative protection.212 This in turn fuels
a consumer society that benefits from innovation in two ways: (1)
innovators profit from their labor and (2) consumers are able to use
technologies derived from IP rights. Chinese society is further
benefited through the enjoyment of legitimate—rather than pirated—
products that are safe to use.
The BRI is poised to bring significant infrastructure growth to China
and its trading and investment partners in the coming years. Because of
this, it is imperative that IP rights that result from the BRI are strongly
protected by China. IP rights will play an important role for China in
the transition towards a post-industrial, knowledge-based economy to
protect R&D and ensure a stable, steady stream of revenue.
Furthermore, significant protection of IP rights will boost China’s
emerging consumer society. The correlation between strong IP
protection and strong developed economies adds to the importance that
China act now rather than leaving IP protection on the backburner.

Dynasties is a more clear example of the use of trademarks. Of
course, the most frequently cited is the “White Rabbit” trademark
of Liujiazhen Shop in Jinan, Shandong Province during the
Northern Song Dynasty. It not only has the white rabbit pattern
holding the medicine pestle, but also the words “Recognize the
white rabbit in front of the door as a mark[.]”
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